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Abstract
Emerging and developing countries have a less diversied international portfolio
than developed countries (Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013). This paper explores the
hypothesis that this actually reects a stronger preference of a creditor country
for the local asset than of a debtor country. We rst document a signicantly
positive relation between a countrys NFA and its degree of portfolio home bias,
and then develop an asymmetric two-country model to show that: (1) when net
external positions are unbalanced, countries have an incentive to hedge against the
risk associated with international interest payments; (2) depending on their status
on external payments, the hedging works the opposite way in the two countries;
and (3) taking the local asset as an example, the hedging is positive in the creditor
country while negative in the debtor country so the creditor country will demand
more local asset than the debtor country.
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1 Introduction
Despite increased nancial integration, assets are mostly held domestically.1 In developing
and emerging economies, this asset home bias has been even more salient (Coeurdacier and
Rey, 2013): the bias degree in these countries has, on average, been around 15% higher
than in developed countries over the last few decades.2 At the same time, these countries
have been also experiencing a dramatic improvementin their net external position as
compared to developed countries (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). This paper explores the
possibility that the asset-bias gap between developing and developed countries actually
reects the di¤erence between creditor and debtor countries. That is, an emerging creditor
country needs to hold more domestic assets as required by optimal risk-sharing, which
prevents its degree of home bias from declining.
We examine the empirical relevance of this hypothesis by rst looking at some cross-
country evidence from the late 1980s. Through OLS regressions, we nd a very signicant
positive correlation between one countrys degree of home bias and its GDP -scaled NFA.
The signicance of the relation remains after we control for a series of other factors
that may a¤ect the degree of international diversication. In particular, we include the
countrys trade openness, per-capita GDP and population to control for the e¤ects of
integration level, development stage and country size on the bias level. We also exploit a
panel data in our investigation. The evidence from both the time-average and panel data
regressions generally supports the above hypothesis.
To uncover the casual link between the degree of home bias and net external im-
balances, we develop a model of net and gross country portfolios based on a workhorse
international macro model (Backus et al., 1994, 1995). According to the recent literature
1See, e.g., French and Poterba, 1991, Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994 and Tesar and Werner, 1995, etc,
for early contributions.
2Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) nd that emerging markets have less diversied equity portfolios than
developed countries and do no exhibit any clear downward trend in home bias. They also nd a similar
pattern for the bond portfolios. On average, around 70% of the equity are held locally in developed
countries while it is 84% for developing and emerging countries (Table 1 of Sercu and Vanpee, 2007,
2008). Using a di¤erent measure, i.e. the di¤erence between 1 and the ratio of the share of foreign equity
in a countrys portfolio over that in the world portfolio to measure the home-bias degree, Coeurdacier
and Rey (2013) nd an average degree of home bias of 0.9 in emerging and developing countries, which
is around 20 percent higher than in developed countries.
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on gross country portfolios, in such a framework, the presence of non-tradable income
risks accounts for the emergence of home bias (Heathcote and Perri, 2013, Coeurdacier
et al., 2010), while according to the literature on net external imbalances, the unequal
amount of non-tradable risks across countries contributes to global nancial imbalances
(Caballero et al., 2008, 2017, Jin 2012). However, these two strands of literature do not
formally interact in the sense that the former focuses on identical countries (so that the
home bias is symmetric) while the latter typically abstracts from the problem of country
portfolios by assuming either only one asset traded internationally or a fully complete
asset market (Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013). This paper considers di¤ering non-tradable
risks in a two-country portfolio model to allow unbalanced net positions to impact on
otherwise symmetrically biased gross positions, from which the pattern of an asymmetric
asset home bias arises endogenously.
Specically, we follow the literature by assuming that the two countries are di¤erent
such that in the home developed country, nancial wealth accounts for a relatively larger
proportion of total wealth than in the foreign developing country. We use this asymmetry
to capture some deeper aspects that di¤er between developed and developing countries,
meanwhile admitting their role in directing international capital ows. For instance,
Caballero et al. (2008, 2017) attribute this to nancial development while Jin (2012)
relates this to industrial structure. According to the rst type of explanation, many factors
of nancial and social development inuence the stock of nancial assets that nally
formed in the economy by a¤ecting the pledgeability of future income streams. Important
reasons include those related to the development of nancial markets, the quality of the
law system (especially those associated with the protection of property rights), public and
corporate governance, etc, which tend to be relatively poor in developing countries and
result in a relatively lower asset stock share. This asymmetry may also reect the possible
di¤erence in industrial structure. As argued by Jin (2012), in an economy mainly relying
on tea gathering, the country would be more likely to feature a large share of labour
income. This international dispersion of industrial structure also underlies the argument
of comparative advantage and is widely used in the analysis of international trade.
The di¤ering development of the home and foreign countries, embodied by the assumed
asymmetry in wealth division, drives the upstream net capital ows in the model. The
home developed country, with a relatively high level of asset supply and facing an excess
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asset demand from the foreign developing country, ends up being a net debtor while the
foreign emerging country is a creditor. What do these persistent global NFA imbalances
imply for international diversication? It yields an asymmetric portfolio allocation: while
local assets are preferred in both countries, the degree of home bias is higher in the creditor
developing country than in the debtor developed country, as observed in the data.
Why is this? As is well known, when distinguishing between labour and nancial
incomes, the portfolio holdings consist of labour hedging and self-hedging (Baxter and
Jermann, 1997). A portfolio home bias emerges due to a positive labour income hedging
that o¤sets the negative self-hedging in a countrys holding of domestic assets (Heathcote
and Perri, 2013, Coeurdacier et al., 2010, etc.). When countries are identical, these
hedging terms are equal in the two countries, i.e. the same degree of home bias in
both countries. When country development di¤ers, however, the bias remains but is
more (less) salient in the foreign (home) country because: (1) with the attendant global
imbalances, optimal country portfolios need to hedge against risks associated with net
external imbalances in addition to the aforementioned self-hedging and labour hedging;
(2) this additional hedging in the two countries has opposite signs due to their opposite
status in international payment; (3) taking a countrys holding of domestic assets as an
example, it is negative in the debtor country while positive in the creditor country.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some empirical evidence
on the positive relation between a countrys net external asset and its degree of home
bias. We present our theoretical model in Section 3 and its qualitative implications for
country portfolios in Section 4. The model is calibrated and robustness-checked in Section
5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Data pattern
We motivate our theory by looking at the cross-country evidence on the relation between
a countrys net external position and its degree of asset home bias.
We dene and discuss how we measure the two variables rst. The net external
position is dened as NFA per GDP . In order to measure the bias degree, we follow the
literature by relying on the basic international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) to
construct an index that measures how far the actual portfolio deviates from the ICAPM
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benchmark.3 Under the ICAPM , all investors should hold the world market portfolio.
That is, the share of domestic assets in each countrys portfolio should be equal to that of
the world portfolio (correspondingly, the share of foreign assets in the country portfolio
is also equal to that of the world portfolio). Or, more conveniently, in each country, the
share of the domestic capital stock that is owned by domestic investors should be equal to
1=N where N denotes the number of countries in the world.4 Therefore, one can use the
following two approaches to construct the index. Along the rst approach, one denes,
e.g. Sercu and Vanpee (2007, 2008)
1h =
Share of home asset in country is portfolio
Share of home asset in the world market portfolio
  1
Under the ICAPM , the rst ratio on the right-hand side equals 1. The index becomes
0, which means no portfolio home bias at all. The higher the index, the further the
related allocation is from that implied by the ICAPM (i.e. a higher degree of home
bias). Following the same logic, one can dene, e.g. Coeurdacier and Rey (2013)
1f = 1  Share of foreign asset in country is portfolioShare of foreign asset in the world market portfolio
These two indices should make consistent predictions. But this is not always true,5 which
undermines either of them as a good measure of the bias degree. In fact, taking into
account heterogeneous market capitalisation, 1h tends to overstate the home bias while
1f understates it for a country of lower capitalisation.6 Along the second approach, one
can dene
2h = Share of domestic asset held domestically  1
N
2f =
N   1
N
  Share of domestic asset held by international investors
which are free of this inconsistency problem. Therefore, throughout this paper, we use
the share of the domestic capital stock held domestically as the index of the home-bias
degree.7
3See survey papers by, for instance, Sercu and Vanpee, 2007 and Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013.
4See Panel A of Figure 1 as an example.
5See Panel B of Figure 1 as an example.
6The opposite happens for a country of higher capitalisation, see Figure 1 as an example.
71=N disappears because it is the same for all countries.
For the explained reason, i.e. 1h and 1f overstate or understate the home bias depending on whether
a country has a lower or higher market capitalisation, our result in this paper becomes more robust if
1h is adopted. Our result does not necessarily hold if 1f is adopted.
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In our samples, we include the countries for which we can nd consistent data of the
above two measures.8 The nal sample is composed of 17 developed countries and 17
emerging countries (Appendix A). The sample period spans over the two decades before
the last global crises, 1987  2007, which is slightly longer than that of similar studies by
Heathcote and Perri (2013) and Mukherjee (2015).
Like Heathcote and Perri (2013), we interpret the asset in our theoretical model to
be any asset that represents a claim to country output. Thus, to construct the index of
home bias, dened by (Value of capital stock - Total external liabilities)/Value of capital
stock, we need the data on gross foreign liabilities and the total value of the asset stock.
We obtain the data on gross external assets/liabilities (and NFA positions) from the
exhaustive data set collated by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). For the total value of the
asset stock, before 1990, we use the formula of Value of capital stock = GDPCapital
output ratiowhere the Capital output ratio is directly taken from Dhareshwar and
Nehru (1995). For those after 1990, we follow Heathcote and Perri (2013) in computing
it using the perpetual inventory method. To apply this method, we require output and
investment data which are obtained from the World Bank development indicators. The
other macroeconomic series, such as those of total population and international trade, are
also obtained from the World Bank.
Figure 2 plots the time averages of the degree of home bias across countries against
that of net external positions. The data, rst of all, conrm that the asset home bias
is a prevalent fact in international investment. Then, we observe that a country with a
higher net external surplus tends to have a deeper home bias. We add a line in the gure
to represent the best linear t for the data, which makes this positive relation clearer.
We use OLS regressions to test the signicance of the above relation, see Table 1.
In column (1), we report the result of the regression when the regressor contains only
the net external positions. It appears that NFA=GDP and the home-bias degree are
very signicantly correlated, with a positive coe¢ cient of 0:203. Like Heathcote and
Perri (2013), in columns (2) to (4), we control for trade openness, output and country
size that may have e¤ects on gross portfolio choices. In addition, we add a dummy of
developing country to allow these e¤ects to di¤er between the developing and developed
countries. It turns out that the above correlation is still signicant. The associated
8Due to the special role of some countries as a nancial centre, a few samples are dropped out.
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Figure 1: International portfolio allocations: Full diversication and home bias. Note:
Assume two countries with a market capitalisation of 6 (home) and 4 (foreign), respec-
tively. The optimal portfolio (ICAPM) will be such that (Panel A): in net terms, the
home holdings of home and foreign assets are 3 and 2 and the foreign holdings of foreign
and home assets are 2 and 3. The share of the domestic asset in the country portfolio
is equal to that of the world portfolio, 3=5 in the home country and 2=5 in the foreign
country. The share of the domestic asset held locally is 1=2 for both countries. Consider
a case of home bias (Panel B) where each country holds one unit more of the local asset
for the same market capitalisations: in net terms, the home holdings of home and foreign
assets are 4 and 1 and the foreign holdings of foreign and home assets are 3 and 2. In the
home country, 1h = 1=3 is lower than that in the foreign country 1h = 1=2, indicating
a higher bias degree in the foreign country. By contrast, in the home country 1f = 1=2
is higher than that in the foreign country 1f = 1=3, suggesting, however, the opposite
conclusion.
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Figure 2: Net external position versus Portfolio home bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NFA per capita 0.268*** 0.243*** 0.303*** 0.324*** 0.315*** 0.295***
(0.0512) (0.0493) (0.0480) (0.0439) (0.0448) (0.0489)
Trade openness -0.466*** -0.414*** -0.435*** -0.460*** -0.441***
(0.0540) (0.0403) (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0403)
Log GDP per capita -0.134*** -0.149*** -0.103*** -0.0875***
(0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0176) (0.0192)
Log population -0.0213 -0.0201
(0.0160) (0.0160)
Developing country 0.0674*** 0.0686***
(0.0189) (0.0188)
Constant 0.749*** 0.862*** 1.393*** 1.625*** 1.404*** 1.181***
(0.0141) (0.0160) (0.0588) (0.154) (0.160) (0.0894)
Observations 714 714 714 714 714 714
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.216 0.364 0.365 0.370 0.369
Table 1: Asset home bias and external imbalance: Time average. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ***, **, * represent signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NFA per capita 0.398** 0.409** 0.418*** 0.419*** 0.385***
(0.179) (0.154) (0.149) (0.152) (0.135)
Trade openness -1.632*** -1.112** -1.090* -0.214
(0.373) (0.522) (0.571) (0.348)
Log GDP per capita -0.524 -0.510 0.276
(0.425) (0.423) (0.198)
Log population -0.0890 2.726***
(0.560) (0.603)
Constant 0.785*** 1.209*** 3.140* 3.752 -20.54***
(0.0489) (0.107) (1.590) (4.298) (4.857)
Observations 714 714 714 714 714
Countries 34 34 34 34 34
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.407 0.424 0.424 0.630
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES
Table 2: Asset home bias and external imbalance: Panel data. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***, **, * represent signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level, respectively.
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coe¢ cients are always positive, with their values varying across specications, but do
not change radically as compared to column (1). We also comment on the coe¢ cients
of these additional variables. Similar to the ndings of Heathcote and Perri (2013), the
trade openness of a country tends to be negatively associated with the home bias. This
is because the more open is the country, the higher is the level of risk-sharing provided
by terms-of-trade responses, which makes a more biased portfolio less required (Cole and
Obstfeld, 1991). Heathcote and Perri (2013) do not nd a signicant e¤ect of per-capita
output on portfolio diversication, while we obtain an accurate estimate here. This is due
to our inclusion of a group of emerging markets in the sample. The associated coe¢ cient
is below zero, in line with the observation that low-income countries tend to have a less-
diversied portfolio. Similar interpretations apply to the positive coe¢ cient of developing
countries. However, the magnitude of these e¤ects is relatively small as compared to
that of NFA=GDP . To interpret this, even though the net external imbalances have
roots in a countrys underdevelopments, once the imbalances are controlled, the e¤ects
contributed by the remaining country di¤erences are limited. We view this as evidence
supporting the idea that the net portfolio global imbalances matter more in explaining a
gross portfolio home bias. Like Heathcote and Perri (2013), we do not nd any signicant
e¤ect of country size on the degree of asset home bias. We get rid of this factor. The
result of our preferred model in column (6) shows that a 1% increase of NFA=GDP is
associated with around a 0:3 percentage increase of the bias degree in the data.
Besides, we make use of the panel data for analysis, attempting to check if the evolu-
tion of net external imbalances is closely related to the variations of the degree of portfolio
diversication as our hypothesis would suggest. We use the same set of controls as above,
see Table 2. The coe¢ cients of NFA=GDP are always positive (with a value of around
0:4) and very accurately estimated, indicating that an improvement of net external posi-
tions signicantly strengthens the preference for domestic assets.
To sum up, we nd that debtor (creditor) countries tend to hold less (more) home
assets in their portfolios. We develop a model of country portfolios to explain why this is
the case.
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3 A model of net and gross country portfolios
Consider an open economy of two countries, Home and Foreign. Each country is populated
by the innitely lived OLG households à la Weil (1989). That is, a population of measure
1 is born at time t = 0 and then grows at a net rate of n (the gross rate dened as
~n  1 + n). Any per-capita variable x can then be obtained by aggregating individual
variables xvt via
xt =
x0t + nx
1
t + n~nx
2
t :::+ n~n
t 1xtt
~nt
where v and t of xvt denote vintage and time respectively.
The rest of the model follows Backus et al. (1994, 1995) and, more recently, Heath-
cote and Perri (2013) with international portfolios.9 As compared to Heathcote and Perri
(2013), the innovative aspects of our model are to introduce di¤ering country develop-
ments, specied below, and the above OLG structure.10 We present the whole model
now.
3.1 Householdsproblem
Households of vintage v have a total utility function at time t
U vt = Et
1X
i=0
i

log
 
cvt+i

+  log
 
1  hvt+i

where cvt and h
v
t denote individual consumption and labour supply.  and  are respec-
tively the intertemporal discount factor and a weight controlling the relative importance
of consumption and leisure.
9For a brief description of the model structure: in each country, households make decisions on consump-
tion, portfolio and labour supply. Domestic capital and labour cannot be traded internationally. They are
used within the border by rms to produce a country-specic intermediate good, with their production
technologies being hit by stochastic shocks. The two intermediate goods are then traded internationally
to produce the nal goods that are ready for use. In terms of nancial markets, two equity-style assets
are traded, respectively representing claims on the prot made by the intermediate-good producers in
each country.
10The di¤ering country development is used to explain global imbalances. The OLG structure is a
technical device that is used to ensure model stationarity in the asymmetric international economy.
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They face the budget constraint
v1t+1 + 
v
2t+1= r1t
v
1t + r2t
v
2t + l
v
t cvt
where generation vs labour/human income lvt equals the product of labour supply h
v
t and
real wage (nominal wage gt over CPI, pt): lvt =
gt
pt
hvt . 
v
1t and 
v
2t are their net holding of
home and foreign assets. r1t and r2t constitute two assetsgross rate of return (dened
later). Let the gross wealth wvt  v1t + v2t. The constraint reads
wvt+1 = r2tw
v
t + 
v
1trxt + l
v
t   cvt
where rxt = r1t   r2t represents the excess return of asset 1 over asset 2.
The households problem is to choose optimal cvt , l
v
t , 
v
t s to maximize U
v
t ; subject to
the budget constraints. The associated rst-order conditions are
vt = (c
v
t )
 1
(cvt )
 1 = Et
h
r1t+1
 
cvt+1
 1i
(cvt )
 1 = Et
h
r2t+1
 
cvt+1
 1i
hvt = 1  
pt
gt
cvt
where vt is the related Lagrangian multiplier.
Foreign households maximize the utility function of the same form, however, subject
to
st
 
v1t+1 + 
v
2t+1

= st (r1t
v
1t + r2t
v
2t ) +l
v
t  cvt
where st denotes the real exchange rate at time t, i.e. the price of the home consumption
basket in terms of the foreign basket. It appears in the constraint because, apart from the
asset-related variables (including the foreign asset holding vt and return r2t) which are
denoted in terms of the home basket, all other variables are in terms of their local basket
in the model. The related rst-order conditions are similar to those of the home country.
By the demographic structure, all other equations than Euler equations are linear and
can hence be easily aggregated.11 In particular, per-capita budget constraints read
~n (1t+1 + 2t+1) = r1t1t + r2t2t + lt ct
11For example, per-capita labour income is the product of real wage and per-capita labour supply,
lt =
gt
pt
ht.
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st~n
 
1t+1 + 

2t+1

= st (r1t

1t + r2t

2t) +l

t ct
~n emerges because, following Weil (1989), new generations are assumed to be born with
no assets, i.e. tt = 0. For the Euler equations, we log-linearize them rst and then
aggregate (Appendix C).
The asset returns r1t and r2t are
r1t=
dt + ~nz1t+1
z1t
; r2t=
(dt=st) + ~nz2t+1
z2t
where z1t and z2t denote the prices of asset 1 and 2 (both in terms of the home basket) at
the end of period t   1. dt and dt are the dividends paid by the home and foreign rms
(specied below). st converts the dt into the home basket.
3.2 Firms problem
A Cobb-Douglas technology is used to produce the intermediate good
xt = e
"t (kt)
 (ht)
1  ; xt = e
"t (kt )
 (ht )
1 
Here "t and "t represent technology shocks following
"t = "t 1 + t; "t = "

t 1 + 

t
where 0 <  < 1. The innovations  and  are zero-mean i:i:d processes with the property
of var () = var () = 2 and cov () = 0.
With this type of production function,  and 1  represent the shares of nancial (non-
human) and labour (human) wealth. We assume the home country to be more developed:
 > . At the most basic level, the s denote the capital shares in production. So this
asymmetry is related to any factor, both physical (e.g. natural resource and technology
stock) and institutional (e.g. education, law, political system or/and particular industrial
policies), that restricts an underdeveloped country from substituting labour with more use
of machines when producing. As explained by Caballero et al. (2008, 2017), s level also
depends on one countrys ability to capitalize future income or, in their words, its ability
in generating a storage of value, which also links it to a societys nancial developments
(and social institutions such as law systems). The question of which particular one or
mix of these deep characteristics of country drives the asymmetric s is interesting but
12
outside the scope of this study. We use a lower  as a simple way of capturing these
underdevelopments of the foreign country and then investigate how this feature impacts
international portfolios.
The rm maximizes the sum of the present value of all future dividends. The dividend
is given by the di¤erence between the revenue and the sum of input costs
dt =
qt
pt
xt   lt   it
Here qt denotes the price of the home intermediate good. qt=pt is thus its price in terms
of the home nal good. Investment is given by it = ~nkt+1   kt.
The rst-order condition of optimal choices of labour and capital demand is
MPLt =
gt
qt
rkt =
qt
pt
MPKt + 1:
The two intermediate goods are combined to form nal goods y and y through
yt =
h

1
 (xht)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (xft)
 1

i 
 1
yt =
h
(1  ) 1 (xht)
 1
 + 
1

 
xft
 1

i 
 1
where xht and xft denote home demands for home and foreign intermediate goods. xht
and xft denote the corresponding foreign demands.  is the elasticity of substitution
between the home and foreign intermediate goods. Following the literature, we assume a
consumption home bias, 1=2 <  < 1.
Given this technology, the related consumption-based price indices read
pt =
"
 (qt)
1  + (1  )

qt
st
1 # 11 
pt =
h
(1  ) (stqt)1  +  (qt )1 
i 1
1 
where qt is the price of the foreign good. The law of one price holds for the two interna-
tionally traded goods, so the foreign price of the home good is given by stqt and the home
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Home holdings Foreign holdings
Asset 1-Home equity 1 1
Asset 2-Foreign equity 2= w   1 2= w 1
Table 3: Net asset holdings across countries
price of the foreign good q

t
st
. The demands for the intermediate goods are
xht = 

qt
pt
 
yt; xft = (1  )

qt
stpt
 
yt
xht = (1  )

stqt
pt
 
yt ; x

ft = 

qt
pt
 
yt
3.3 Market clearing
In equilibrium, all markets clear. In the intermediate goods market, we have xht + xht =
xt; xft + x

ft = x

t , while in the nal goods market, ct + it = yt, c

t + i

t = y

t . For the
asset market, see Table 3, the market clearing requires 1t + 1t = z1t; 2t + 

2t = z2t,
which are equivalent to 1t = z1t 1t; wt  z1t =   (wt   z2t). While the interpretation
of the rst formula is obvious, the second formula states that the net external positions
of home and foreign countries are of the same size but have the opposite sign. Let ft be
the net foreign asset at the end of time t   1. This formula reduces to ft =  f t . Note
that, with the asset market clearing conditions, we only need to compute any of the four
asset holdings. Next, we choose to rst compute 1t   z1t =  1t, i.e. the home gross
holding of the home asset.
4 Qualitative analysis
We rst show that in steady state, global imbalances emerge. Then, we discuss its impli-
cations for the degree of portfolio diversication in di¤ering countries.
4.1 Global imbalances
Appendix C derives the steady-state level for all non-portfolio variables, see Table 4.
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Normalising the GDPs to 1, the following relations hold in steady state:
(1) i = n
(r 1) ; l = (1  ) ; d = (r ~n)(r 1) ; i = n

(r 1) ; l
 = (1  ) ; d = (r ~n)
(r 1) 
;
(2) w = (r 1)(1 )
(~n r)(r 1) ; z1 = k =

(r 1) ; w
 = (r 1)(1 
)
(~n r)(r 1)s ; z2 =
k
s
= 

(r 1)s ;
(3) f = w   z1= r 1 n(~n r)(r 1) < 0; f  = 1s r 1 n

(~n r)(r 1) > 0;
(4) r = 1+n

where   (+s)
(1+s)
;
(5) c =
h
1  n
r 1
i h
1 +
 
1 
i
< c =
h
1  n
r 1
i h
1 +
 
1 
i
.
Table 4: Non-portfolio variables in steady state
The total income of a country consists of labour and dividend incomes aside from
investment, see line (1). The more developed is a country, the higher is the share of
dividend income while the lower is the share of labour income. This will impact the total
asset demand and supply of each country.
Making use of the aggregate budget constraint and consumption function, we obtain
the law of motion of asset demand in the two countries. For instance, in the home country,
it is wt+1=
r
~n
wt+
(r 1)
~n(r 1) lt. Under the condition r < ~n=, we obtain the steady-state wt,
see line (2). If r > 1=, which is veried below, w is an increasing function of the labour
income share: households save by holding assets. The asset supply is increasing in the
nancial income share.
Moreover, intuitively, when the asset yields a slightly higher return, the asset demand
will rise while the asset supply will decrease
@w
@r
=
(r   1)2 + n (1  )
[(~n  r) (r   1)]2 (1  )> 0;
@z
@r
=   
(r   1)2< 0
This implies a upward-sloping asset demand schedule and a downward-sloping asset supply
schedule in a conventional Metzler diagram (Figure 3). In autarky, NFA equals zero,
which determines the steady-state interest rate at
ra =
1 + n

:
It positively depends on time preference 1

, population growth n and, in particular, country
development . Therefore, with time preference and population growth being equal, a
developing country of low  will feature excess savings and a relatively lower autarky
interest rate, which drives its net capital outows in an open global economy.
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Figure 3: The Metzler diagram of global imbalances
To see this, the international interest rate is determined by f+f  = 0, r = 1+n

where
  (+s)
(1+s)
2 (; ). First, 1

< r < ~n

is veried. Second, r lies in between the autarky
interest rates of the two countries ra < r < ra, which means f = (r r
a)
(~n r)(r 1) < 0 and
f  = 1
s
(r ra)
(~n r)(r 1) > 0. Capital ows from the foreign to the home country in net terms.
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4.2 Globally asymmetric home bias
Below, we compute the steady-state portfolio. We compare our results to those in the
literature and highlight the role of global imbalances in generating the hedging of net
external payment and hence, the asymmetric asset home bias.
As a standard procedure, we approximate the model to the rst-order accuracy (Ap-
12For line (5) of Table 5, we obtain the steady-state consumptions from the budget constraints or,
equivalently, c = 1   i + (r   ~n) f , c = 1   i + s (r   ~n) f. The nal good demands are therefore
y = c + i = 1 + (r   ~n) f , y = c + i = 1 + s (r   ~n) f. One countrys total spending is given by its
total income or GNP : the sum of its GDP (that is normalised to 1) and net external income. If, as a
dynamically e¢ cient case for instance, r > ~n, the debtor (creditor) countrys disposable expenditure will
be less (more) than its average GDP . Because the debtor country has a higher capital stock and will
invest more on average anyway, i.e. i > i, the international payment e¤ect is reinforced in leading to
a higher consumption level in the debtor country. If, however, r < ~n, the two e¤ects are o¤setting each
other but the investment e¤ect dominates. So in any case of the model, the consumption of the debtor
home country will be lower as compared to the creditor foreign country.
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pendix D).13 We dene and focus on solving for   1  z1, i.e. the home gross holding
of the home asset. Because the home country is the default supplier of the home asset,
a realistic  satises  z1 <  < 0.14 Appendix E shows that  is determined by the
models rst-order behaviours (variables with a hat)
Et 1

c^Dt r^xt

= 0
c^Dt = c^t   c^t + s^t   (1  ) (c^nt   c^nt + s^t) stands for the portfolio-relevant cross-country
consumption di¤erential.   r=~n < 1 equals the steady-state share of consumption
by the existing population in this model.15 r^xt  r^1t   r^2t is the excess return of asset
1 relative to asset 2. The above condition states that households choose a portfolio to
achieve optimal risk sharing. Depending on the income risks involved in c^Dt ,  is built up
by a series of hedging motives. Appendix F shows that c^Dt is
(r    ~n)

1
c
+
s
c

r^xt +
r    ~n
r

dt + lt +

1
c
+
s
c

rfrn2t

  (1  ) cnt
where dt, lt, rfrn2t = rf
1
i=0

~n
r
i
r^2t+i and cnt respectively represents the home
countrys relative nancial income, relative labour income, external interest payment and
the relative consumption of newborns.16
A partial equilibrium  is therefore
 =   cc

(cs+ c) r
cov (dt; r^xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Self-hedging ( )
  cc

(cs+ c) r
cov (lt; r^xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging labour income (+)
 f cov (
rn
2t ; r^xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging interest payment ( )
+
cc
(cs+ c)
(1  )
(r    ~n)
cov (cnt ; r^xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging newborns consumption
 is composed by:
1. The hedging of nancial income (or self-hedging) which is negative. By the asset
pricing relation, the (relative) rate of return on the asset is an increasing function of
13See, e.g. Devereux and Sutherland (2011) and Tille and Wincoop (2010).
14The absolute value of  is viewed as the level of gross external liability by the home country while it
is seen as the level of gross external asset by the foreign country.
15The remainder 1   is hence the share of consumption of the newly-born population, see Appendix
C.
16Their exact expressions are in Appendix F .
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(relative) dividend, i.e. cov (dt; r^xt) > 0. The domestic asset is shorted as a bad hedge
against the associated risk.
In an endowment model where all wealth is capitalizable and countries are identical
(Lucas, 1982), the relative nancial income represents the whole source of risk in the c^Dt
so only the self-hedging term remains in ~. Because dt = r(r 1) r^xt and c = c
 = s = 1,
we have  = 1
2
z1, i.e. the full diversication of portfolios.
2. The hedging of labour income which appears because we distinguish between -
nancial and labour incomes.17 The current model follows Heathcote and Perri (2013)
in obtaining a positive labour hedging and otherwise a symmetric portfolio home bias:
Suppose that the home country is hit by a positive productivity shock, the home terms
of trade deteriorate. This stimulates (relative) home investment (due to the goods home
preference) and reduces the home dividend. Given that labour income always increases
in response to positive supply shocks, the dividend and labour incomes move in opposite
directions, i.e. a positive labour hedging that partially o¤sets the negative self-hedging.
By relative labour income, this mechanism works in the same way across countries,
which explains a symmetric home bias.
3. The hedging of international interest payment that we would like to highlight in
this paper. It appears because, as explained, the di¤ering country development results
in persistent NFA imbalances and hence, the associated hedging motive. This hedging
is negative in the home country. With f < 0, the home country has to pay an external
interest payment. When the home assets excess return is low (the home country experi-
ences a positive productivity shock), the amount of interest payment, as a function of r^2t,
is relatively high (compared to if the foreign country is shocked). So the home countrys
disposable income and consumption become relatively low. That is, for a debtor country,
when home consumption is low, the home assets return is also low, which undermines
the home asset as a good investment facing the risk of net external income. Instead, it
17The sign of this hedging depends on the comovement between the two types of income. If they co-
move positively, holding less domestic asset is required to hedge local labour income risk, which implies a
further short term of the domestic asset on top of the above self-hedging. Portfolio allocation should be
foreign biased (Baxtor and Jermann, 1997). If, however, they co-move negatively, the domestic asset o¤ers
a better hedge against local labour income risk. The positive labour hedging hence partially o¤sets the
e¤ect of a negative self-hedging, which delivers a portfolio home bias (Coeurdacier et al., 2010, Heathcote
and Perri, 2013).
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makes the foreign asset more preferred and tends to reduce the degree of home bias.18
Appendix G derives the foreign holding of the foreign asset,   2   z2, from the
fact of  =  + f 
 =   cc

(cs+ c) r
cov (dt ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Self-hedging ( )
  cc

(cs+ c) r
cov (lt ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging labour income (+)
 f  cov (
rn
1t ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging interest payment (+)
+
cc
(cs+ c)
(1  )
(r    ~n)
cov (cnt ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging newborns consumption
where dt =  dt, lt =  lt, cnt =  cnt , r^xt =  r^xt respectively denote the
relative nancial income, labour income, the newlyborns consumption from the perspec-
tive of the foreign country and excess return of the foreign asset over the home asset.
rn1t = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i
r^1t+i denotes the sum of the present value of asset 1s future rates of
return.
The components of  have the same interpretation as those of . And, except for the
hedging of the international interest payment, all of them equal their counterpart in .
The hedging of the interest payment in , however, has a di¤erent sign than in .
With f  > 0, the foreign country receives an international interest revenue. When the
foreign assets excess return is high (the home country experiences a positive shock), the
amount of the revenue, as a function of r^1t, is relatively low and thus, the foreign countrys
disposable income and consumption will be low. The foreign asset is hence a good hedge
of this risk of interest payment, which requires the foreign country to hold more domestic
asset and strengthens the degree of home bias.
In short, if identical, the two countries will hold identical portfolios,  = . A
di¤ering country development,  > , breaks down this symmetry to the extent that the
hedging of return on net external position di¤ers. It lowers the demand for the domestic
asset in the home (debtor) country while it increases it in the foreign (creditor) country,
so  <  < 0.
18There is an adjustment term due to the newborns consumption. It appears because we assume the
OLG structure and that agents are born with no assets. Therefore, only the existing populations decision
matters in determining portfolios. The presence of this term then corresponds to the deduction of the
newborns consumption,   (1  ) cnt in c^Dt .
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The degrees of home bias are19
  z1 + 
z1
= 1 +

z1
;  =
z2 + 

z2
= 1 +

z2
As implied by the presence of z1 and z2, this CAPM -based measurement admits that the
country with higher capitalisation should also hold more of the domestic asset. Because
the di¤ering s also cause unequal capitalisation levels, country developments operate
through two channels in a¤ecting the bias levels. While the above hedging of interna-
tional interest payment lowers (increases)  in the home (foreign) country, the unequal
capitalisation levels have the opposite e¤ect. Below, we show numerically that, under
a reasonable parameterization, the hedging channel dominates the market capitalisation
channel and therefore will yield a lower (higher)  in the home (foreign) country.
5 Numerical analysis
5.1 A baseline calibration
Let a year be the model frequency. The top section of Table 5 shows the parameteri-
zation of our baseline calibration. Following the literature, we set  = 0:97. The OLG
structure in the model is only used to ensure model stability. We choose a small number
of n = 10 5 here. Together with the choice of , this value implies a real interest rate
of around 3 percent, consistent with the calibration target that appears in the existing
literature of modelling both developed and developing countries, for instance, Uribe and
Yue (2006), Caballero et al. (2008) and Hnatkovska et al. (2016).2021 Like Caballero et
19As explained in Section 2, there is a home bias when  is higher than 1=N where N denotes the total
number of countries in the world, i.e. when  > 1=2 in our two-country model.
20Besides, as mentioned by the footnote 18, the presence of population growth generates an adjustment
term associated with the newbornsconsumption in . By choosing a small n, we ensure that the size of
this adjustment term is small and does not drive our result.
21Under the baseline calibration, r is given by 1:031 while the exchange rate is below unity, s = 0:996.
The latter is because the foreign country maintains a higher level of GNP and consumption by receiving
external interest revenues. With the same degree of home goods preference in the two countries, there
must be a higher demand for foreign goods x. Therefore, to clear the market, the relative price of
home goods and thus, that of the home basket, must be cheaper. (For convenience of exposition, when
computing steady-state relative prices, we normalize the home price of the foreign good to unity, i.e.
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Variable Description Value
 Discount factor 0:97
n Net population growth rate 10 5
 Wealth division parameter in the home country 0:12
 Persistence of productivity shocks 0:95
 Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 0:9
 Share of local intermediate goods in nal goods 0:65
= 0:11 = 0:1
z1 Home market capitalization 3:8799 3:8799
z2 Foreign market capitalization 3:5713 3:2592
f Home NFA (GDP is normalised to 1) 0:1830 0:3647
 Gross holding of home asset by home households  0:7220  0:7214
 [1] Self-hedging  1:8159  1:6876
 [2] Hedging of labour income 1:2328 1:2480
 [3] Hedging of international payment  0:1390  0:2819
 [4] Adjustment to newbornsconsumption 0 0
 Gross holding of foreign asset by foreign households  0:5390  0:3567
 [1] Self-hedging  1:8159  1:6876
 [2] Hedging of labour income 1:2328 1:2480
 [3] Hedging of international payment 0:0440 0:0828
 [4] Adjustment to newbornsconsumption 0 0
1= z1+ Home holding of home asset 3:1578 3:1584
2= w   1 Home holding of foreign asset 0:5390 0:3567
1=   Foreign holding of home asset 0:7220 0:7214
2= w
 1 Foreign holding of foreign asset 3:0324 2:9025
 = 1=z1 Asset home bias in the home country 0:8139 0:8141
= 2=z2 Asset home bias in the foreign country 0:8491 0:8906
Table 5: Benchmark calibration
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al. (2008, 2017), we interpret the s as the share of non-human wealth rst. We follow
them in choosing the value of  at 0:12.22 Combined with our assumption of zero capital
depreciation, this yields a value of capital stock around 3 to 4 times of average GDP for
the two countries.23  = 0:11 is rst selected to target a steady-state negative NFA of
around 18% of GDP in the home country, based on U:S: data during 1999   2010. The
persistence of the productivity shock is set at 0:95; its median estimate by Smets and
Wouters (2007).  is chosen to be 0:9 (Heathcote and Perri, 2013).  is set such that the
local goods account for 65% of the input of nal goods.24
The bottom section of Table 5 reports the portfolio choices and the implied bias
degree in the two countries. As analysed, the self-hedging is negative while the hedging
of labour income is positive.25 They are symmetric for the two countries. The hedging of
international interest payment is, however, negative in the home country while positive in
the foreign country, thereby generating a lower degree of home bias in the home country.
Figure 4 depicts the portfolio allocation. In the middle are the four portfolio net
holdings. To see the global imbalances, note that the foreign holding of the home asset
outweighs the home holding of the foreign asset, 1 > 2. To see the asymmetric home
bias, note that a lower share of the domestic asset remains domestically in the home
country,  = 1
1+1
<  = 

2
2+2
. On the left and right-hand sides, we decompose
the portfolio gross holdings  and  into self-hedging, labour hedging and the hedging
of international interest payment. Because the other two hedging terms are symmetric
across countries, the heterogeneity of the bias degree is associated with global imbalances
through the asymmetric distribution of the hedging of international interest payment.
q=s = 1, so the terms of trade of the home country, dened as the price of exports in terms of imports
is equal to q=(q=s) = q in the model.)
22Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2016) estimate a close value for the US nancial wealth share at 0:13.
23Under the parameterization, in steady state, in the home country, we have z1 = 3:8799 and w =
3:6968. In the foreign country, we have z2 = 3:5713 and w = 3:7544. In other words, the total wealth of
a country is about 3:8 times of GDP . As a reference, Caballero et al. (2008) target a value of country
wealth of 4 times GDP for the advanced country. According to the dataset collated by Heathcote and
Perri (2013), however, this ratio averages at around 2:5 over the period 1970 2010 in the U:S. A positive
capital depreciation reduces this ratio. We allow for this below when conducting robustness checks.
24Given that s are chosen to be relatively low, we choose  and  to also be low relative to their
typical estimates in the literature so as to ensure a home bias in both countries (Heathcote and Perri,
2013). We will relax this in the robustness checks.
25The hedging of newborns consumptions is negligibly small due to our choice of n.
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Figure 4: Portfolio allocation under the baseline calibration ( = 0:12,  = 0:11)
Unsurprisingly, these results will become more salient when the -gap widens. As
another experiment, we set a lower  = 0:1 to target larger NFA imbalances at around
36% of GDP , see also Table 5.26 When the size of the -gap doubles, the magnitude of
the excess home bias in the foreign country roughly doubles as well. That is, as the global
imbalances diverge, the excess home bias in the foreign country is sustained, in line with
Coeurdacier and Reys (2013) observation that developing countries do not exhibit any
clear downward trend in home bias.
5.2 Robustness checks
We focus on the following cases where we allow for: (1) varying parameter values; (2)
capital depreciation and an alternative interpretation of the -asymmetry; (3) additional
26The U.S. net external nancial position kept deteriorating after the 2007 crisis. The NFA=GDP
ratio (in absolute value) has reached over 40%. The global imbalances are expected to continue diverging,
see, e.g. International Monetary Funds 2017 External sector report.
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Figure 5: Asset home bias (vertical axis) and Wealth division  (horizontal axis)
hedging motive of exchange rate risk; and (4) alternative country asymmetry of household
patience.
5.2.1 Parameter values
Wealth division parameters, the s So far, we have relied on Caballero et al.s
(2008, 2017) interpretation of  as the non-human wealth share. Some literature suggests
that this share can be as high as around 1=3, e.g. Lettau (2001) estimates it at 0:31. This
is similar to the case where s are interpreted as the capital share of income.27 To see if
our result remains, we change the value of , while keeping constant the -gap, from the
current value of 0:12 up to around 0:4. Figure 5 shows that the portfolio in the home
country is always less home-biased.
When the s increase, both lines decline. This is economically sensible because, when
the s increase, there is less labour income risk to be hedged by more available hedging
vehicles. The portfolios can be less home-biased in both countries.
So far, we also assumed zero capital depreciation in the model and chose a low value
27Therefore, the asymmetry is more related to industrial structure as argued by Jin (2012).
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of s to target a reasonable value of asset supply, which corresponds to Caballero et al.s
(2008) endowment-economy model. Interpreting s as capital shares of income, we extend
our model to allow for positive capital depreciation.28 Repeating the above experiment, we
nd that the results are quite similar to those displayed in Figure 5 except that portfolios
are slightly more biased in both countries.29 The asymmetric home bias remains because
the inclusion of capital depreciation does not a¤ect the working of the hedging mechanism.
The bias is enhanced because a higher level of the depreciation rate implies a lower level
of equity stock. In order to hedge against the same amount of labour income risk, a larger
share of domestic assets should be held domestically.30
Elasticity of substitution between goods,  One implication of the choice of  is
that, the higher is , the higher are the s. This is due to the fact that when the two goods
are more substitutable, in response to a positive shock to home-country productivity, the
resulting price responses are moderated (Cole and Obstfeld, 1991). The weakening of
the stabilizing terms-of-trade e¤ect leaves a heavier load of risk-sharing to be achieved
through portfolio diversication. This requires the domestic assets to be outweighed.
For the purpose of the robustness check, we do not need to worry too much about the
left-hand side of  because given a very low value of s that has been chosen, we have also
selected a very low  = 0:9 to avoid the counterfactual case of s being greater than 1.
According to the literature, these extremely low values of  are less likely to be relevant.
In the literature,  is usually set at around or higher than unity, e.g. Stockman and Tesar
(1995) and Backus et al. (1995). Feenstra et al. (2014) estimate a median of the macro
elasticity to be close to (but higher than) 1 and the microone to be even higher (up to
2 times larger). In Figure 6; we vary  in the neighbourhood of 0:9. As long as the asset
home bias takes place in both countries,  <  is always observed for di¤ering levels of
28The extension is straightforward. The note for the extended model with a positive capital depreciation
is available upon request.
29When we set  = 0:33,  = 0:9 such that NFA is again (around) 18% of GDP , f = 0:1839, the
annual depreciation rate of 0:1 as usually used/estimated in the literature (e.g. Backus et al., 1994, Smets
and Wouters, 2007), the other parameter values as in the baseline calibration, the degrees of home bias in
the two countries are:  = 0:6820 vs  = 0:7288. Abstracting from the capital depreciation, the degrees
are:  = 0:6683 and  = 0:7180.
30We return to the baseline model of zero capital depreciation in the following checks, unless otherwise
stated.
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Figure 6: Asset home bias (vertical axis) and Trade elasticity  (horizontal axis)
trade substitutability.
The gap between  and  increases as  increases. This is because, given the s,
asset supplies (the zs) are mainly determined by an r that is insensitive to . However,
a rise in  drives up the net holdings of the domestic assets.  hence grows faster than
 because the foreign country has a lower asset supply.31
Degree of home goods preference,  Similar to the case of , a higher  implies
higher s in both countries. The change of  a¤ects the magnitude of the terms-of-
trade e¤ect as well. Consider, for instance, that the home country experiences a positive
productivity shock. On the supply side, this shock leads to a terms-of-trade deterioration,
which partially o¤ers risk-sharing. However, on the demand side, a higher  implies
an increased demand for the home good, which counteracts the terms-of-trade e¤ect.
Portfolio hedging becomes more important in terms of sharing risks. The portfolio home
bias will therefore be enhanced. However, our result of an asymmetric home bias is not
31In other words, the hedging channel of determination of  is more elastic than the market capitali-
sation channel in response to .
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Figure 7: Asset home bias (vertical axis) and Local good preference  (horizontal axis)
a¤ected, see Figure 7. As long as the portfolios in both countries exhibit a home bias, 
is lower in the home country.
For a similar reason to that of , when  increases, the discrepancy between  and 
becomes larger. Given that  is usually considered to be higher than 0:65, e.g. around
0:85 as in Backus et al., 1994, Corsetti et al., 2008, Heathcote and Perri, 2013, the pattern
of  <  will only become more signicant for such a higher .
Shock persistence,  We vary  from 0 to 0:99 in the model and always nd a higher
 than . Figure 8 reports the result where  varies from 0:8 to 0:99. Similar to the above
results,  <  survives while the s increase as the shocks become more persistent. This
is because, the higher is , the more volatile are all income streams, in particular, dt
and lt. Nevertheless, because non-nancial wealth in the model accounts for a relatively
larger share of total wealth,  < 1=2, the increase in volatility of lt is more signicant
than that of dt. This enhances the role of hedging of labour income relative to that of
self-hedging in , which leads to a less diversied portfolio in both countries. Otherwise,
if nancial wealth were to account for a relatively large share of total wealth, its volatility
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Figure 8: Asset home bias (vertical axis) and Shock persistence  (horizontal axis)
would grow relatively fast when  increases, which would result in a reversed e¤ect on
the s. In either case, the di¤ering hedging of international interest payment dominates
and the result of  <  remains.
5.2.2 Hedging exchange-rate risk
Taking into account additional hedging motives will not change our result as long as they
are symmetric. We illustrate this point by extending our model with a hedging of the
exchange-rate risk. For this purpose, we replace the logarithmic utility function of our
baseline model with a more commonly-used CRRA function
U vt =
1X
i=0
i
" 
cvt+i
1 1=
1  1=   
 
hvt+i
1+
1 + 
#
where  denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and  the (inverse) elasticity
of substitution of labour supply.
As explained in Appendix I, we can nd the optimal portfolio of this extended model
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Figure 9: Asset home bias (vertical axis) and Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
(horizontal axis)
as the sum of the existing hedging terms and an additional hedging of exchange-rate risk
 =   cc

(cs+ c) r
cov (dt; r^xt)
var (r^xt)
  cc

(cs+ c) r
cov (lt; r^xt)
var (r^xt)
  f cov (
rn
2t ; r^xt)
var (r^xt)
+
cc
cs+ c
(1  )
(r    ~n)
cov (cnt ; r^xt)
var (r^xt)
  cc

(cs+ c) r
 (r   ~n)
(r    ~n) (  1)
cov (st ; r^xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging exchange rate
where st = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i
s^t+i.
This hedging is symmetric across countries and is positive when  < 1.32 Like the
labour hedging, it will not change our result of an asymmetric home bias. To see this, we
32As analysed in the symmetric set-up, e.g. Coeurdacier and Rey (2012), the hedging of the exchange-
rate risk depends on two forces going in opposite directions: when domestic goods are more expensive,
households need to generate more income in order to stabilize their purchasing power. Or, households
could delay consumption until domestic goods become cheaper. Which force wins depends on how strong
is householdsdesire in smoothing consumption across states. For households su¢ ciently reluctant to
adjust consumption intertemporally,  < 1, the former e¤ect dominates and households want to increase
their income when their consumption goods are more expensive. In the model, because the home asset
yields a higher return when the home good becomes more expensive (a negative shock to the home
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simulate the model under the previous parameterization.  is set at 1 following Heathcote
and Perri (2013). Combined with  = 1, this yields s that are close to those of the
baseline model. In Figure 9, we vary  from 0:9 to 1:2. As long as the portfolios in the
two countries exhibit an asset home bias, the pattern of  <  is always true.
The gure shows that the lower is , the higher are the s and the bias gap. The s are
both higher because, as explained, the hedging channel will become more important when
 decreases. The bias gap widens because, again, the hedging channel is more responsive
to the change of  than the market capitalisation channel.
5.2.3 Alternative country asymmetry of patience
The real reason for the so-called global imbalances or uphill capital ows could be com-
posite (see, e.g., Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013, Gourinchas and Rey, 2014). This paper
emphasizes that, once the country asymmetry opens non-zero NFA positions, it creates
the need to hedge against the risk associated with the international interest payment
which, in turn, leads to an asymmetric portfolio home bias globally.
As an example, within our framework, we investigate the possibility that the house-
holds in the two countries have di¤ering levels of patience  < . Appendix J presents
the details of such a model. Based on the baseline parameterization, we calibrate this
model. Specically, we set two s at 0:12 and  = 0:97.  is selected such that the
NFA=GDP ratio is, again, around 18% rst and then 40%. Table 6 reports the associ-
ated results, from which the excess home bias in the foreign (creditor emerging) country
re-emerges. The result in fact becomes more robust in the sense that the same level of
global imbalances implies a even larger bias gap between the two countries. This is be-
cause, as discussed, in the baseline model of di¤ering s, there is a market capitalisation
channel that moderates the e¤ect of the hedging channel while in the current model, this
market capitalisation channel collapses. Di¤ering s do not imply unequal asset supplies,
z1 = z2, which leaves only the hedging channel alive and allows the bias gap to grow.33
country production), i.e. cov (st ; r^xt) > 0, the hedging of the exchange-rate risk is positive and enhances
the asset home bias.
33This paper does not aim to identify and evaluate the contribution of each driving force of global
imbalances. We use the result to emphasise that, as long as the di¤ering s are not the only cause of the
observed global imbalances, the hedging of international interest payment highlighted here explains more
of the bias gap between countries since the market capitalisation channel is not as important as in our
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Variable Value
 0:97
 =  0:95% n  =  1:9% n
z1 3:8798 3:8798
z2 3:8958 3:9110
f 0:1803 0:3612
  0:7822  0:8443
1 3:0976 3:0355
2 0:6019 0:4831
1 0:7822 0:8443
2 3:2938 3:4279
 0:7984 0:7824
 0:8455 0:8765
Table 6: Calibration of the model of di¤ering patience
6 Conclusion
The uphill international capital ows and a more severelack of international portfolio
diversication in developing and emerging countries can be causally correlated. We devel-
oped a model of endogenous net and gross country portfolios to show that: under global
NFA imbalances, agents have a motive to hedge against the interest payments that are
associated with unbalanced external positions. Because the hedging has an opposite sign
across countries, the portfolio allocation moves away from an otherwise symmetrically
home-biased pattern: the creditor (developing) country will hold domestic assets more
intensively than the debtor (developed) country, in line with the data observation.
Portfolio models that are based on hedging motives are quite successful in account-
ing for country portfolio facts, especially for the asset home bias of symmetric models
(Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013). Our result shows that, in asymmetric situations, this type
of model is consistent with the data as well. Like Heathcote and Perri (2013), we inter-
pret the model equity as any asset that represents a claim to country output and do not
distinguish between bond and equity assets. The next step can be to develop a model of
benchmark model of a single country asymmetry of di¤ering s.
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multiple-asset type (Coeurdacier and Gourinchas, 2016) in light of the so-called two-way
capital ows (Ju and Wei, 2010, Wang et al., 2015). Moreover, motivated by the literature
which attempts to explain the home bias with market integration and trade costs (Tesar
and Werner, 1995, Warnock, 2002), one may wonder if a model with asymmetric levels of
trade openness and trade cost provides a complementary force to the channel identied in
this paper.34 There have also been many empirical studies considering the role of geogra-
phy, culture and institutions (see, for instance, Portes and Rey, 2005, Chan et al., 2005,
Daude and Fratzscher, 2008 among others) in explaining di¤erences in country portfolios.
Guided by our results, the countrys net external balance should be taken into account in
such a study.
34From our baseline calibration, after all, the di¤ering hedging explains around 1=3 of the bias gap.
However, for such a model to work, besides the di¢ culty that already exists when explaining a symmetric
home bias (Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012), it may need a group of developing countries that trades in a
more costly way within their group than another group of developed countries to do so.
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A Country sample for the regression of Section 2
34 countries included in the sample are:
Developing/Emerging countries: Argentina (ARG), Bangladesh (BGD), Brazil (BRA),
Chile (CHL), China (CHN), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Korea Republic (KOR),
Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Pakistan (PAK), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), South
Africa (ZAF), Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR) and Venezuela (VEN).
Developed countries: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Canada (CAN), Denmark
(DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Iceland (ISL),
Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Portugal (PRT), Spain
(ESP), Sweden (SWE) and United States (USA).
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